On the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War the leaders of the military uprising immediately asked the German government for help. The first request was for ten transport planes to ferry Nationalist troops from Morocco to Spain. Constantin von Neurath, the German foreign minister, initially rejected the request, expressing fears that such a move could lead to a European war. Adolf Hitler did not agree with Neurath and after consulting with Herman Goering, Wilhelm Canaris and Werner von Blomberg, he told General Francisco Franco on 26th July 1936 that Germany would support his rebellion.
Hitler justified his decision by arguing that he was attempting to save Europe from "communist barbarism". Another reason was that it brought Germany closer to Italy, a country that was also supporting the military uprising in Spain. Hitler also knew that a Nationalist victory would give him an important ally in his struggle with Britain and France. He was especially interested in obtaining iron, copper, mercury and pyrites from Spain for his armaments industry.
Another factor in Hitler's decision was that providing military aid to the Nationalist Army would give him the opportunity to test out his commanders, weapons and tactics.
On 27th July, 1936, Adolf Hitler sent the the Nationalists 26 German fighter aircraft. He also sent 30 Junkers 52s from Berlin and Stuttgart to Morocco. Over the next couple of weeks the aircraft transported over 15,000 troops to Spain. The fighter aircraft soon went into action and the Germans suffered their first losses when airmen Helmut Schulze and Herbert Zeck were killed on 15th August.
In September 1936 a Non-Intervention Agreement was drawn-up in London and signed by 27 countries including Germany, Britain, France, the Soviet Union and Italy. Hitler continued to give aid but attempted to disguise this by sending the men, planes, tanks, and munitions via Portugal.
Lieutenant Colonel Walther Warlimont of the German General Staff arrived as the German commander and military adviser to General Francisco Franco in September 1936. The following month Warlimont suggested that a German Condor Legion should be formed to fight in the Spanish Civil War.
Hitler hoped this would not be necessary as General Francisco Franco claimed he was on the verge of victory. This prediction proved to be wrong and in November the International Brigades and aircraft and tanks from the Soviet Union began arriving in Madrid.
Hitler now gave permission for the formation of the Condor Legion. The initial force consisted a Bomber Group of three squadrons of Ju-52 bombers; a Fighter Group with three squadrons of He-51 fighters; a Reconnaissance Group with two squadrons of He-99 and He-70 reconnaissance bombers; and a Seaplane Squadron of He-59 and He-60 floatplanes.
The Condor Legion, under the command of General Hugo Sperrle, was an autonomous unit responsible only to Franco. The legion would eventually total nearly 12,000 men. Sperrle demanded higher performance aircraft from Germany and he eventually received the Heinkel He111, Junkers Stuka and the Messerschmitt Bf109. It participated in all the major engagements including Brunete, Teruel, Aragon and Ebro.
During the war Werner Moelders was credited with fourteen kills, more than any other German pilot. In the Asturias campaign in September 1937, Adolf Galland experimented with new bombing tactics. This became known as carpet bombing (dropping all bombs on the enemy from every aircraft at one time for maximum damage). German aircraft dropped 16,953,700 kilos of bombs during the war and air units expended 4,327,949 rounds of machine-gun ammunition.
Adolf Hitler also sent four tank companies under the command of Colonel Wilhelm von Thoma. He was also in charge of all German ground troops in Spain. He later commented: "Their numbers were greatly exaggerated in newspaper reports - they were never more than 600 at a time. They were used to train Franco's tank force and to get battle experience themselves."
A total of 19,000 Germans served in the Spanish Civil War. Of these, 298 were lost, with 173 being killed by the enemy. This included 102 aircrew, 27 fighter pilots and 21 anti-aircraft crew. A large number were killed in accidents and others died of illness. The Condor Legion lost 72 aircraft to enemy action. Another 160 were lost in flying accidents.
When the civil war broke out in Spain Franco sent a call for help to Germany and asked for support, particularly in the air. Franco with his troops was stationed in Africa and he could not get his troops across, as the fleet was in the hands of the communists. The decisive factor was, first of all, to get his troops to Spain. The Führer thought the matter over. I urged him to give support under all circumstances: firstly, to prevent the further spread of communism; secondly, to test my young Luftwaffe in this or that technical respect.
Though German aid to Franco never equalled that given by Italy, which dispatched between sixty and seventy thousand troops as well as vast supplies of arms and planes, it was considerable. The Germans estimated later that they spent half a billion marks on the venture 37 besides furnishing planes, tanks, technicians and the Condor Legion, an Air Force unit which distinguished itself by the obliteration of the Spanish town of Guernica and its civilian inhabitants. Relative to Germany's own massive rearmament it was not much, but it paid handsome dividends to Hitler.
It gave France a third unfriendly fascist power on its borders. It exacerbated the internal strife in France between Right and Left and thus weakened Germany's principal rival in the West. Above all it rendered impossible a rapprochement of Britain and France with Italy, which the Paris and London governments had hoped for after the termination of the Abyssinian War, and thus drove Mussolini into the arms of Hitler.
From the very beginning the Fuehrer's Spanish policy was shrewd, calculated and far-seeing. A perusal of the captured German documents makes plain that one of Hitler's purposes was to prolong the Spanish Civil War in order to keep the Western democracies and Italy at loggerheads and draw Mussolini toward him.
The role played by the Spanish conflict as regards Italy's relations with France and England could be similar to that of the Abyssinian conflict, bringing out clearly the actual, opposing interests of the powers and thus preventing Italy from being drawn into the net of the Western powers and used for their machinations. The struggle for dominant political influence in Spain lays bare the natural opposition between Italy and France; at the same time the position of Italy as a power in the western Mediterranean comes into competition with that of Britain. All the more clearly will Italy recognize the advisability of confronting the Western powers shoulder to shoulder with Germany.
In the course of the next three years Germany sent men and military supplies, including experts and technicians of all kinds and the famous Condor Air Legion. German aid to Franco was never on a major scale, never sufficient to win the war for him or even to equal the forces sent by Mussolini, which in March 1937 reached the figure of sixty to seventy thousand men. Hitler's policy, unlike Mussolini's, was not to secure Franco's victory, but to prolong the war. In April 1939, an official of the German Economic Policy Department, trying to reckon what Germany had spent on help to Franco up to that date, gave a round figure of five hundred million Reichsmarks, not a large sum by comparison with the amounts spent on rearmament. But the advantages Germany secured in return were disproportionate - economic advantages (valuable sources of raw materials in Spanish mines); useful experience in training her airmen and testing equipment such as tanks in battle conditions; above all, strategic and political advantages.
It only needed a glance at the map to show how seriously France's position was affected by events across the Pyrenees. A victory for Franco would mean a third Fascist State on her frontiers, three instead of two frontiers to be guarded in the event of war. France, for geographical reasons alone, was more deeply interested in what happened in Spain than any other of the Great Powers, yet the ideological character of the Spanish Civil War divided, instead of uniting, French opinion. The French elections shortly before the outbreak of the troubles in Spain had produced the Left-wing Popular Front Government of Leon Blum. So bitter had class and political conflicts grown in France that - as in the case of the Franco-Soviet Treaty - foreign affairs were again subordinated to internal faction, and many Frenchmen were prepared to support Franco as a way of hitting at their own Government.
A pessimistic view is taken here of events in Spain. There is no indication yet whether the Government or the insurgents are likely to prevail. Everything points to a protracted and sanguinary civil war.
The insurgents have the advantage of getting outside help whereas the Government is getting none. The latter has applied to the French Government for permission to import arms from France, but so far at least permission has not been given. The insurgents, on the other hand, are being assisted by the Italians and Germans.
During the last few weeks large numbers of Italian and German agents have arrived in Morocco and the Balearic Islands. These agents are taking part in military activities and are also exercising a certain political influence.
For the insurgents the belief that they have the support of the two great 'Fascist Powers' is an immense encouragement.
But it is also more than an encouragement, for many of the weapons now in their hands are of Italian origin. This is particularly so in Morocco.
The German influence is strongest in the Balearic Islands. Germany has a great interest in the victory of the insurgents.
Apparently she hopes to secure concession in the Balearic Islands from them when they are in power. These islands play an important part in German plans for the future development of sea-power in the Mediterranean.
The civil war is of particular interest to Germany because the victory of the insurgents would open the prospect (closed by Anglo-French collaboration and by the existence of a pro-British, pro-French, and pro-League Spanish Republic) of action in Western Europe. That is to say, a 'Fascist' Spain would, for Germany, be a means of 'turning the French flank' and of playing a part in the Mediterranean.
On the Spanish mainland Germany disposed of a numerous and extremely well-organised branch of the National Socialist party. This branch has been strongly reinforced by newcomers from Germany during the last few weeks. She also disposes of a powerful organization for political and military espionage, which works behind a diplomatic and educational facade. Barcelona in particular has a large German population, the greater part of which is at the disposal of the National Socialists.
The fate of Morocco is naturally of the highest interest to Germany, for if the insurgents are victorious she may hope to secure territorial concessions in Morocco and therefore a foothold in Northern Africa.
Following the taking possession by General Franco of the greater part of Spanish territory and now that the developments of the past weeks have shown with increasing clarity that there can be no longer any talk of a responsible Government in the other portions of Spain, the Reich Government has decided to recognise the Government of General Franco and to appoint a Charge d'Affaires for the opening of diplomatic relations.
The new German Charge d'Affaires will proceed in due course to the seat of government of General Franco. The German Charge d'Affaires, who up to now has been in Alicante, has been recalled. The Charge d'Affaires of the former Spanish Government left Berlin by his own decision at the beginning of November.
Two thousand 'S.S.' (Blackshirts) have been assembled at Munich and are about to leave for Spain. The assembled 'military division' of the SS are a fully trained and equipped military formation, 30,000 or 60,000 strong, and have the value of a Regular Army. Their function in case of war is chiefly the maintenance of order at home - this, as the German authorities conceive it, is a military task, for the menace of rebellion at home is reckoned with as the accompaniment of war abroad.
The reason why SS and not Regulars (Reichswehr) are being sent to Spain would seem to be, partly at least, that they are to gain experience in street fighting. The 2,000 men have been withdrawn from various 'divisions' of the SS and tanks have been assigned to them. They are to go via Austria to Italy, and will embark for Spain at an Italian port.
There is some discontent in the SS because their men are being sent to Spain as 'volunteers'. A good deal of grumbling is heard, and some SS men have been saying that the Regulars ought to go to Spain because 'that is what they are there for'.
The fact that German troops are fighting on the side of the Spanish rebels is becoming more and more widely known in Germany, in spite of the recent official German denial that there is a single German soldier in Spain. Reports of German casualties are spreading and have, no doubt, influenced the attitude of the SS.
We the members of the British working class in the British Battalion of the International Brigade now fighting in Spain in defence of democracy, protest against statements appearing in certain British papers to the effect that there is little or no interference in the civil war in Spain by foreign Fascist Powers.
We have seen with our own eyes frightful slaughter of men, women, and children in Spain. We have witnessed the destruction of many of its towns and villages. We have seen whole areas which have been devastated. And we know beyond a shadow of doubt that these frightful deeds have been done mainly by German and Italian nationals, using German and Italian aeroplanes, tanks, bombs, shells, and guns.
We ourselves have been in action repeatedly against thousands of German and Italian troops, and have lost many splendid and heroic comrades in these battles.
We protest against this disgraceful and unjustifiable invasion of Spain by Fascist Germany and Italy; an invasion in our opinion only made possible by the pro-Franco policy of the Baldwin Government in Britain. We believe that all lovers of freedom and democracy in Britain should now unite in a sustained effort to put an end to this invasion of Spain and to force the Baldwin Government to give to the people of Spain and their legal Government the right to buy arms in Britain to defend their freedom and democracy against Fascist barbarianism. We therefore call upon the General Council of the T.U.C. and the National Executive Committee of the Labour party to organise a great united campaign in Britain for the achievement of the above objects.
We denounce the attempts being made in Britain by the Fascist elements to make people believe that we British and other volunteers fighting on behalf of Spanish democracy are no different from the scores of thousands of conscript troops sent into Spain by Hitler and Mussolini. There can be no comparison between free volunteers and these conscript armies of Germany and Italy in Spain.
Finally, we desire it to be known in Britain that we came here of our own free will after full consideration of all that this step involved. We came to Spain not for money, but solely to assist the heroic Spanish people to defend their country's freedom and democracy. We were not gulled into coming to Spain by promises of big money. We never even asked for money when we volunteered. We are perfectly satisfied with our treatment by the Spanish Government; and we still are proud to be fighting for the cause of freedom in Spain. Any statements to the contrary are foul lies.
Germany's new Messerschmidt aeroplanes have been tested in the Spanish civil war. The pilots are pledged before they leave Germany never to let their planes fall into the hands of the enemy. Each pilot has orders to set fire to his plane if it is brought down or has to make a forced landing on enemy soil. Each plane has a special tank of inflammable matter that can be ignited at once for this purpose.
The German pilots in Spain are used more in combined infantry and air attacks than in air raids, which are chiefly carried out by the Italians. The German military experts are particularly interested in developing the art of offensive operation by all arms combined, the air arm included, and Spain is proving to be a valuable experimental field. They are of opinion that the decisive blow in future wars will be delivered by combined operations of this kind.
I was in command of all the German ground troops in Spain during the war. Their numbers were greatly exaggerated in newspaper reports - they were never more than 600 at a time. They were used to train Franco's tank force and to get battle experience themselves.
Our main help to Franco was in machines-aircraft and tanks. At the start he had nothing beyond a few obsolete machines. The first batch of German tanks arrived in September, followed by a larger batch in October. They were the Panzer I.
Russian tanks began to arrive on the other side even quicker - at the end of July. They were of a heavier type than ours, which were armed only with machine-guns, and I offered a reward of 500 pesetas for every one that was captured, as I was only too glad to convert them to my own use.
By a carefully organized dilution of the German personnel I was soon able to train a large number of Spanish tank-crews. I found the Spanish quick to learn though also quick to forget. By 1938 I had four tank battalions under my command - each of three companies, with fifteen tanks in a company. Four of the companies were equipped with Russian tanks. I also had thirty anti-tank companies, with six 37 mm guns apiece.
General Franco wished to parcel out the tanks among the infantry-in the usual way of generals who belong to the old school. I had to fight this tendency constantly in the endeavour to use the tanks in a concentrated way. The Francoists' successes were largely due to this.
I came back from Spain in June, 1939, after the end of the war, and wrote out my experiences and the lessons learned.
In 1936-9 Great Britain and other European and American countries were beginning to think in terms of the coming world conflict. The fact that Hitler and Mussolini helped the Spanish Nationalists was a cause of great and perhaps natural prejudice in those countries, though it should be noted that those who criticized us for accepting Hitler's help saw nothing strange in the acceptance of Stalin, who had invaded Poland with Hitler, as their ally in World War II. When men are fighting for all that is dear to them they accept help from wherever it comes. But the loose habit of referring to all authoritarian regimes other than the Communist as 'Fascist' made it hard for people to appreciate the vast differences that separate the Spanish Falange from Nazism.
The Spanish Civil War, begun in July 1936, was a preliminary round of World War II. Hitler’s and Mussolini’s cooperation with General Franco resulted in the Axis agreement of October 1936 and the subsequent Pact of Steel of May 1939, immediately following the end of the Civil War.
This study presents comprehensive documentation of Hitler’s use of the upheaval in Spain to strengthen the Third Reich diplomatically, ideologically, economically, and militarily. While the last great cause drew all eyes to Western Europe and divided the British and especially the French internally, Hitler could pursue territorial gains in Eastern Europe.
This book, based on little-known German records and recently opened Spanish archives, fills a major gap in our understanding of one of the 20th century’s most significant conflicts. Its comprehensive treatment of German-Spanish relations from 1936 through 1939, bringing together diplomatic, economic, military, and naval aspects, will be of great value to specialists in European diplomacy and the political economy of Nazi imperialism, as well as to all students of the Spanish Civil War.
Robert H. Whealey is associate professor of history at Ohio University.
An imperative starting point of any future inquiry concerning Nazi Germany’s incursion into and manipulation of Spain’s civil strife. -- International History Review
Germany and the Spanish Civil War - History
German Involvement in the Spanish Civil War is the sourcework topic for the IGCSE Sourcework Paper in 2009. Here is a complete scheme of work to ensure that students maximise their chances in the examination for this topic.
1. Causes of the Spanish Civil War [ interactive ]
Students use this interactive newsfeed to develop an understanding of the main events leading up to the Spanish Civil War, which they then categorise into social, economic, military and political factors. They produce a biased account from either a Republican or a Nationalist perspective, then consolidate their knowledge by producing a learning diagram using www.classtools.net.
2. Causes of the Spanish Civil War: Sourcework
A series of pictorial and written sources with questions about the causes of the Spanish Civil War designed to familiarise students with the format of the IGCSE Sourcework examination.
3. Which Party Would You Have Supported During the Spanish Civil War? [ interactive ]
An interactive simulation. Rank the problems facing Spain which are the most urgent, then select which policies you think are the most appropriate response for each. At the end of the simulation you will then be told which party most closely matched your own preferences. Complete with a detailed worksheet to help students compare and contrast the various parties on the eve of the Civil War.
4. What was the International Significance of the Spanish Civil War?
This worksheet outlines why the Spanish Civil War was so important in an international sense. The roles of the major powers are outlined and compared and cartoons relating to the non-intervention committee are analysed.
5. Why did Germany get involved in the Spanish Civil War?
Students analyse a series of written sources - primary and secondary - to develop an understanding of why Germany got involved in the Spanish Civil War. By comparing, contrasting, organising points under key headings and summarising their findings, students will end this lesson with a sound grasp of Germany's motives. Sourcework questions invite students to consider the reliability of the sources and expand on each with elements of background knowledge: key skills for the IGCSE sourcework paper. Students could also use this interactive Diamond 9 diagram at www.classtools.net.
6. What did Germany contribute to the Spanish Civil War?
A decision-making exercise. Students are asked a series of questions about how they think Hitler should have organised his help to Franco's Nationalists. The teacher then tells the students what actually happened in each case so that the class can discuss the merits and drawbacks of each policy. Sourcework questions round the exercise off.
7. Case study of German involvement: Guernica
The most notorious example of German involvement in the Spanish Civil War was when the Nazi Condor Legion bombed the Basque city of Guernica. This lesson investigates the event through a detailed analysis of Picasso's painting provided by Simon Schama's excellent documentary (available here).
8. What were the main events of the Spanish Civil War?
Students should be provided with this interactive newsfeed covering the main events of the Spanish Civil War and then divide these into "Good news for the Republic" and "Bad news for the Republic". They then have to use their own knowledge of international events in the 1930s to add a final column in the timeline placing each event in its international context: this "Play Your Dates Right" quiz could be used to help students with this. To round off, they precis two interesting sources: one from Dolores Ibarruri, and one from Ernest Hemingway, each giving their verdict on the role of the International Brigades. A second Play your Dates Right quiz tests knowledge of both the events leading up to the war and of the war itself and works particularly well when displayed on an interactive whiteboard with teams pitted against each other to get the best score.
9. What were the consequences of the Spanish Civil War for Spain and for the International Community?
Students are provided with a list of essential points relating to the international consequences of the Spanish Civil War. These are analysed in terms of what Hitler's objectives were, and what the actual results were - thereby keeping a close focus on the subject of the sourcework paper for 2009 (Germany Involvement in the Spanish Civil War). The class is then asked to consider how crucial German involvement in the Spanish Civil War was in terms of Franco's victory. Sourcework questions round the worksheet off.
10. Sourcework Examination Practice: German Involvement in the Spanish Civil War
A 90-minute sourcework exercise in the format of the IGCSE exam. There is a generic markscheme for this exercise which can be used by teachers.
11. Interactive Cartoon Analysis: German involvement in the Spanish Civil War
Five cartoons, 10 questions: students provide their own answers using the writing framework provided, then they can compare their answers alongside model answers which I have written to help them revise. A great way to develop sourcework skills.
August 1 Under British pressure, France reverses its policy of helping Republican Spain, and together the two nations found the Non-Intervention Committee.
At the pleading of the Marqués de Viana and the exiled ex-king of Spain, Alfonso XIII, Benito Mussolini sends aircraft in support of the rebels. Mussolini wants money for this help the Spanish billionaire Juan March Ordinas pays for the Italian aircraft. Because Franco has no air personnel or pilots, Mussolini sends the aircraft with Italian pilots. After two of the aircraft crash on their way in the French protectorate in Morocco, the world becomes aware of this clear breach of nonintervention. August 2 Troops of the rebellious Spanish Legion, led by Colonel Carlos Asensio Cabanillas and Major Antonio Castejón Espinosa, start their advance from Seville towards Madrid. August 6 Josep Sunyol, a Republican Left of Catalonia deputy and president of FC Barcelona, is caught in an ambush in the Guadarrama and is killed by pro-Franco troops.
General Franco arrives in Seville. August 8 France closes its border with Spain.
While Majorca is still in hands of the nationalists, Ibiza and Formentera are back in Republican hands. August 10 The Nationalists take Mérida on their way to Madrid cutting off the Republicans in Badajoz. The well-known female Republican activist Leiva is executed by the Nationalists. Major Heli Rolando de Tella y Cantos defeats a Republican counterattack on the city. August 14 Nationalist forces under Colonel Juan Yagüe attack and conquer Badajoz, uniting the two parts of the Nationalist territory. The Republican commander, Colonel Ildefonso Puigdendolas, flees to Portugal. Around 4000 people die during and after the attack in Badajoz. In the local bullring, thousands of people are shot down by the Nationalists with machine guns. See Massacre of Badajoz. August 16 Battle of Majorca begins: The Spanish Republican Army lands on the coast of Majorca under heavy bombardment by Italian planes. Captain Alberto Bayo establishes a small base on the coast. August 19 Viznar, Granada: Federico García Lorca, among others, is murdered by members of the falangist Escuadra Negra. Before being killed, they are forced to dig their own graves. Later, the official excuse for the brutal assassination of García Lorca will be that he was homosexual. August 24 Italy and Germany join officially the Non-Intervention agreement. This gives them the possibility to participate in the international blockade of Spain: Italian and German warships are now allowed to stay in Spanish territorial waters and prevent other ships from reaching the Spanish shore.
The Imperial German Army Air Service was founded in 1910 with the name Die Fliegertruppen des deutschen Kaiserreiches, most often shortened to Fliegertruppe. It was renamed the Luftstreitkräfte on 8 October 1916.  The air war on the Western Front received the most attention in the annals of the earliest accounts of military aviation, since it produced aces such as Manfred von Richthofen and Ernst Udet, Oswald Boelcke, and Max Immelmann. After the defeat of Germany, the service was dissolved on 8 May 1920 under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which also mandated the destruction of all German military aircraft.
Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, German pilots trained in secret. Initially, civil aviation schools within Germany were used, yet only light trainers could be used in order to maintain the façade that the trainees were going to fly with civil airlines such as Deutsche Luft Hansa. To train its pilots on the latest combat aircraft, Germany solicited the help of the Soviet Union, which was also isolated in Europe. A secret training airfield was established at Lipetsk in 1924 and operated for approximately nine years using mostly Dutch and Soviet, but also some German, training aircraft before being closed in 1933. This base was officially known as the 4th squadron of the 40th wing of the Red Army. Hundreds of Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel visited, studied and were trained at Soviet air force schools in several locations in Central Russia.  Roessing, Blume, Fosse, Teetsemann, Heini, Makratzki, Blumendaat, and many other future Luftwaffe aces were trained in Russia in joint Russian-German schools that were set up under the patronage of Ernst August Köstring.
The first steps towards the Luftwaffe ' s formation were undertaken just months after Adolf Hitler came to power. Hermann Göring, a World War I ace, became National Kommissar for aviation with former Luft Hansa director Erhard Milch as his deputy. In April 1933 the Reich Aviation Ministry (Reichsluftfahrtministerium or RLM) was established. The RLM was in charge of the development and production of aircraft. Göring's control over all aspects of aviation became absolute. On 25 March 1933 the German Air Sports Association absorbed all private and national organizations, while retaining its 'sports' title. On 15 May 1933, all military aviation organizations in the RLM were merged, forming the Luftwaffe its official 'birthday'.  The National Socialist Flyers Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Fliegerkorps or NSFK) was formed in 1937 to give pre-military flying training to male youths, and to engage adult sport aviators in the Nazi movement. Military-age members of the NSFK were drafted into the Luftwaffe. As all such prior NSFK members were also Nazi Party members, this gave the new Luftwaffe a strong Nazi ideological base in contrast to the other branches of the Wehrmacht (the Heer (Army) and the Kriegsmarine (Navy)). Göring played a leading role in the buildup of the Luftwaffe in 1933–36, but had little further involvement in the development of the force after 1936, and Milch became the "de facto" minister until 1937. 
The absence of Göring in planning and production matters was fortunate. Göring had little knowledge of current aviation, had last flown in 1922, and had not kept himself informed of the latest events. Göring also displayed a lack of understanding of doctrine and technical issues in aerial warfare which he left to others more competent. The Commander-in-Chief left the organisation and building of the Luftwaffe, after 1936, to Erhard Milch. However Göring, as a part of Hitler's inner circle, provided access to financial resources and materiel for rearming and equipping the Luftwaffe. 
Another prominent figure in German air power construction this time was Helmuth Wilberg. Wilberg later played a large role in the development of German air doctrine. Having headed the Reichswehr air staff for eight years in the 1920s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for a senior staff position.  Göring considered making Wilberg Chief of Staff (CS). However, it was revealed Wilberg had a Jewish mother. For that reason, Göring could not have him as CS. Not wishing his talent to go to waste, Göring ensured the racial laws of the Third Reich did not apply to him. Wilberg remained in the air staff, and under Walther Wever helped draw up the Luftwaffe ' s principle doctrinal texts, "The Conduct of the Aerial War" and "Regulation 16".  
Preparing for war: 1933–1939 Edit
Wever years, 1933–1936 Edit
The German officer Corps was keen to develop strategic bombing capabilities against its enemies. However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities. 
For these reasons, between 1933 and 1934, the Luftwaffe ' s leadership was primarily concerned with tactical and operational methods. In aerial terms, the army concept of Truppenführung was an operational concept, as well as a tactical doctrine. In World War I, the Fliegertruppe's initial, 1914–15 era Feldflieger Abteilung observation/reconnaissance air units, each with six two-seater aircraft apiece, had been attached to specific army formations and acted as support. Dive bomber units were considered essential to Truppenführung, attacking enemy headquarters and lines of communications.  Luftwaffe "Regulation 10: The Bomber" (Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug), published in 1934, advocated air superiority and approaches to ground attack tactics without dealing with operational matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued to act as the main guide for German air operations. The manual directed OKL to focus on limited operations (not strategic operations): the protection of specific areas and support of the army in combat. 
With an effective tactical-operational concept,  the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. Robert Knauss [de] , a serviceman (not pilot) in the Luftstreitkräfte during World War I, and later an experienced pilot with Lufthansa,  was a prominent theorist of air power. Knauss promoted the Giulio Douhet theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and breaking enemy morale by "terrorizing the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians.  The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge strikes against German civilians and cities. 
In December 1934, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff Walther Wever sought to mould the Luftwaffe ' s battle doctrine into a strategic plan. At this time, Wever conducted war games (simulated against France) in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In 1935, "Luftwaffe Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War" was drawn up. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals."  
Corum states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of "terror bombing" (see Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine).  According to Corum, terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist.  Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe ' s main operations destruction of the enemy armed forces. 
Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of strategic bombing. In newly introduced doctrine, The Conduct of the Aerial Air War in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet  and outlined five key points to air strategy: 
- To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets.
- To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
- To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations.
- To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
- To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.
Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called "Ural bomber", which could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. In 1935, this design competition led to the Dornier Do 19 and Junkers Ju 89 prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever issue requirements for the 'Bomber A' design competition: a range of 6,700 km (4,163 mi) with a 900 kg (1,984 lb) bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,  and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost.  The only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A' that reached production was Heinkel's Projekt 1041, which culminated in the production and frontline service as Germany's only operational heavy bomber, the Heinkel He 177, on 5 November 1937, the date on which it received its RLM airframe number. 
In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were grouped into Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL "Air Force High Command").
Following the untimely death of Walther Wever in early June 1936 in an aviation-related accident, by the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organization capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. In fact, on the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe ' s aircraft were devoted to ground support operations, counter to the long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational missions. 
Change of direction, 1936–37 Edit
Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June 1936 when he was killed along with his engineer in a Heinkel He 70 Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. After Wever's death, Göring began taking more of an interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring appointed his successor Albert Kesselring as Chief of Staff and Ernst Udet to head the Reich's Air Ministry Technical Office (Technisches Amt), although he was not a technical expert. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe ' s tactical direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than through industrial bombing of its aviation production. 
Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, 1936–1937, a power struggle developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe. Kesselring also had to contend with Göring appointing "yes men" to positions of importance.  Udet realised his limitations, and his failures in the production and development of German aircraft would have serious long term consequences. 
The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.  The United Kingdom presented greater problems. General der Flieger Hellmuth Felmy, commander of Luftflotte 2 in 1939, was charged with devising a plan for an air war over the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the Munich crisis, evidence he believed of British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the Heinkel He 177A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November 1937 to have moderate dive-bombing capabilities in a 30-meter wingspan aircraft. Moreover, Germany did not possess the economic resources to match the later British and American effort of 1943–1944, particularly in large-scale mass production of high power output aircraft engines (with output of over least 1,500 kW (2,000 hp). In addition, OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic bombing would require. By 1939 the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to conduct a strategic bombing campaign,  with fatal results during the Battle of Britain. 
The German rearmament program faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffe, in particular rubber and aluminium. Petroleum imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants but still failed to meet demands. In 1937 Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. By summer 1938, only 25% of the requirements could be covered. In steel materials, industry was operating at barely 83% of capacity, and by November 1938 Göring reported the economic situation was serious.  The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the overall command for all German military forces, ordered reductions in raw materials and steel used for armament production. The figures for reduction were substantial: 30% steel, 20% copper, 47% aluminium, and 14% rubber.  Under such circumstances, it was not possible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to produce a formidable strategic bombing force even had they wanted to do so. 
The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers that required much less material, manpower and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber". German industry could build two medium bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. Göring remarked, "the Führer will not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are."  The premature death of Wever, one of the Luftwaffe ' s finest officers, left the Luftwaffe without a strategic air force during World War II, which eventually proved fatal to the German war effort.   
The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The Sudeten Crisis highlighted German unpreparedness to conduct a strategic air war (although the British and French were in a much weaker position), and Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size.  OKL badly neglected the need for transport aircraft even in 1943, transport units were described as Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV).  and only grouping them together into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings (Transportgeschwader) during that year. In March 1938, as the Anschluss was taking place, Göring ordered Felmy to investigate the prospect of air raids against Britain. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in Belgium and the Netherlands were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was avoided by the Munich Agreement, and the need for long-range aircraft did not arise. 
These failures were not exposed until wartime. In the meantime, German designs of mid-1930s origin such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Heinkel He 111, Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, and Dornier Do 17, performed very well. All first saw active service in the Condor Legion against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe also quickly realized the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the Heinkel He 51 being switched to service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe ' s requirements for bombers that were faster than 1930s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or strut-braced monoplanes.
Despite the participation of these aircraft (mainly from 1938 onward), it was the venerable Junkers Ju 52 (which soon became the backbone of the Transportgruppen) that made the main contribution. During the Spanish Civil War Hitler remarked, "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju 52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory." 
Poor accuracy from level bombers in 1937 led the Luftwaffe to grasp the benefits of dive-bombing. The latter could achieve far better accuracy against tactical ground targets than heavier conventional bombers. Range was not a key criterion for this mission. It was not always feasible for the army to move heavy artillery over recently captured territory to bombard fortifications or support ground forces, and dive bombers could do the job faster. Dive bombers, often single-engine two-man machines, could achieve better results than larger six or seven-man aircraft, at a tenth of the cost and four times the accuracy. This led to Udet championing the dive bomber, particularly the Junkers Ju 87. 
Udet's "love affair" with dive-bombing seriously affected the long-term development of the Luftwaffe, especially after General Wever's death. The tactical strike aircraft programs were meant to serve as interim solutions until the next generation of aircraft arrived. In 1936 the Junkers Ju 52 was the backbone of the German bomber fleet. This led to a rush on the part of the RLM to produce the Junkers Ju 86, Heinkel He 111, and Dornier Do 17 before a proper evaluation was made. The Ju 86 was poor while the He 111 showed the most promise. The Spanish Civil War convinced Udet (along with limited output from the German munitions industry) that wastage was not acceptable in munition terms. Udet sought to build dive-bombing into the Junkers Ju 88 and conveyed the same idea, initiated specifically by OKL for the Heinkel He 177, approved in early November 1937. In the case of the Ju 88, 50,000 modifications had to be made. The weight was increased from seven to twelve tons. This resulted in a speed loss of 200 km/h. Udet merely conveyed OKL's own dive-bombing capability request to Ernst Heinkel concerning the He 177, who vehemently opposed such an idea, which ruined its development as a heavy bomber.  Göring was not able to rescind the dive-bombing requirement for the He 177A until September 1942. 
Mobilization, 1938–1941 Edit
By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had ready for combat nine Jagdgeschwader (fighter wings) mostly equipped with the Messerschmitt Bf 109E, four 'Zerstörergeschwader (destroyer wings) equipped with the Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighter, 11 Kampfgeschwader (bomber wings) equipped mainly with the Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17Z, and four Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wing") primarily armed with the iconic Junkers Ju 87B Stuka.  The Luftwaffe was just starting to accept the Junkers Ju 88A for service, as it had encountered design difficulties, with only a dozen aircraft of the type considered combat-ready. The Luftwaffe ' s strength at this time stood at 373,000 personnel (208,000 flying troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps and 58,000 in the Signals Corps). Aircraft strength was 4,201 operational aircraft: 1,191 bombers, 361 dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488 transports. Despite deficiencies, it was an impressive force. 
However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe still had not mobilized fully. Despite the shortage of raw materials, Generalluftzeugmeister Ernst Udet had increased production through introducing a 10-hour working day for aviation industries and rationalizing production. During this period 30 Kampfstaffeln and 16 Jagdstaffeln were raised and equipped. A further five Zerstörergruppen ("Destroyer groups") were created (JGr 101, 102,126,152 and 176), all equipped with the Bf 110. 
The Luftwaffe also greatly expanded its aircrew training programs by 42%, to 63 flying schools. These facilities were moved to eastern Germany, away from possible Allied threats. The number of aircrew reached 4,727, an increase of 31%. However, the rush to complete this rapid expansion scheme resulted in the deaths of 997 personnel and another 700 wounded. 946 aircraft were also destroyed in these accidents. The number of aircrew completing their training was up to 3,941, The Luftwaffe ' s entire strength was now 2.2 million personnel. 
In April and May 1941, Udet headed the Luftwaffe delegation inspecting the Soviet aviation industry in compliance with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Udet informed Göring "that Soviet air forces are very strong and technically advanced." Göring decided not to report the facts to Hitler, hoping that a surprise attack would quickly destroy the USSR.  Udet realized that the upcoming war on Russia might cripple Germany. Udet, torn between truth and loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried to tell Hitler the truth, but Göring told Hitler that Udet was lying, then took Udet under control by giving him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet's drinking and psychological condition became a problem, but Göring used Udet's dependency to manipulate him. 
Luftwaffe organization Edit
Luftwaffe commanders Edit
Throughout the history of Nazi Germany, the Luftwaffe had only two commanders-in-chief. The first was Hermann Göring, with the second and last being Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim. His appointment as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe was concomitant with his promotion to Generalfeldmarschall, the last German officer in World War II to be promoted to the highest rank. Other officers promoted to the second highest military rank in Germany were Albert Kesselring, Hugo Sperrle, Erhard Milch, and Wolfram von Richthofen.
At the end of the war, with Berlin surrounded by the Red Army, Göring suggested to Hitler that he take over leadership of the Reich.  Hitler ordered his arrest and execution, but Göring's SS guards did not carry out the order, and Göring survived to be tried at Nuremberg. 
Sperrle was prosecuted at the OKW Trial, one of the last twelve of the Nuremberg Trials after the war. He was acquitted on all four counts. He died in Munich in 1953.
Organization and chain of command Edit
At the start of the war the Luftwaffe had four Luftflotten (air fleets), each responsible for roughly a quarter of Germany. As the war progressed more air fleets were created as the areas under German rule expanded. As one example, Luftflotte 5 was created in 1940 to direct operations in Norway and Denmark, and other Luftflotten were created as necessary. Each Luftflotte would contain several Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), Fliegerdivision (Air Division), Jagdkorps (Fighter Corps),Jagddivision (Air Division) or Jagdfliegerführer (Fighter Air Command). Each formations would have attached to it a number of units, usually several Geschwader, but also independent Staffeln and Kampfgruppen.  Luftflotten were also responsible for the training aircraft and schools in their operational areas. 
A Geschwader was commanded by a Geschwaderkommodore, with the rank of either major, Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) or Oberst (colonel). Other "staff" officers within the unit with administrative duties included the adjutant, technical officer, and operations officer, who were usually (though not always) experienced aircrew or pilots still flying on operations. Other specialist staff were navigation, signals, and intelligence personnel. A Stabschwarm (headquarters flight) was attached to each Geschwader. 
A Jagdgeschwader (hunting wing) (JG) was a single-seat day fighter Geschwader, typically equipped with Bf 109 or Fw 190 aircraft flying in the fighter or fighter-bomber roles. Late in the war, by 1944–45, JG 7 and JG 400 (and the jet specialist JV 44) flew much more advanced aircraft, with JG 1 working up with jets at war's end. A Geschwader consisted of groups (Gruppen), which in turn consisted of Jagdstaffel (fighter squadrons). Hence, Fighter Wing 1 was JG 1, its first Gruppe (group) was I./JG 1, using a Roman numeral for the Gruppe number only, and its first Staffel (squadron) was 1./JG 1. Geschwader strength was usually 120 – 125 aircraft. 
Each Gruppe was commanded by a Kommandeur, and a Staffel by a Staffelkapitän. However, these were "appointments", not ranks, within the Luftwaffe. Usually, the Kommodore would hold the rank of Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) or, exceptionally, an Oberst (colonel). Even a Leutnant (second lieutenant) could find himself commanding a Staffel.
Similarly, a bomber wing was a Kampfgeschwader (KG), a night fighter wing was a Nachtjagdgeschwader (NJG), a dive bomber wing was a Stukageschwader (StG), and units equivalent to those in RAF Coastal Command, with specific responsibilities for coastal patrols and search and rescue duties, were Küstenfliegergruppen (Kü.Fl. Gr.). Specialist bomber groups were known as Kampfgruppen (KGr). The strength of a bomber Geschwader was about 80–90 aircraft. 
|Luftwaffe strength during the fall of 1941|
|Air signal units||250,000|
|Landsturm (militia) units||36,000|
The peacetime strength of the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1939 was 370,000 men. After the mobilization in 1939 almost 900,000 men served, and just before Operation Barbarossa in 1941 the personnel strength had reached 1.5 million men.  The Luftwaffe reached its largest personnel strength during the period November 1943 to June 1944, with almost three million men and women in uniform 1.7 million of these were male soldiers, 1 million male Wehrmachtsbeamte and civilian employees, and almost 300,000 female and male auxiliaries (Luftwaffenhelfer).  In October 1944, the anti-aircraft units had 600,000 soldiers and 530,000 auxiliaries, including 60,000 male members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst, 50,000 Luftwaffenhelfer (males age 15–17), 80,000 Flakwehrmänner (males above military age) and Flak-V-soldaten (males unfit for military service), and 160,000 female Flakwaffenhelferinnen and RAD-Maiden, as well as 160,000 foreign personnel (Hiwis).  
Spanish Civil War Edit
The Luftwaffe ' s Condor Legion experimented with new doctrine and aircraft during the Spanish Civil War. It helped the Falange under Francisco Franco to defeat the Republican forces. Over 20,000 German airmen gained combat experience that would give the Luftwaffe an important advantage going into the Second World War. One infamous operation was the bombing of Guernica in the Basque country. It is commonly assumed this attack was the result of a "terror doctrine" in Luftwaffe doctrine. The raids on Guernica and Madrid caused many civilian casualties and a wave of protests in the democracies. It has been suggested that the bombing of Guernica was carried out for military tactical reasons, in support of ground operations, but the town was not directly involved in any fighting at that point in time. It was not until 1942 that the Germans started to develop a bombing policy in which civilians were the primary targets, although The Blitz on London and many other British cities involved indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas,  'nuisance raids' which could even involve the machine-gunning of civilians and livestock. 
World War II Edit
When World War II began, the Luftwaffe was one of the most technologically advanced air forces in the world. During the Polish Campaign that triggered the war, it quickly established air superiority, and then air supremacy. It supported the German Army operations which ended the campaign in five weeks. The Luftwaffe ' s performance was as OKL had hoped. The Luftwaffe rendered invaluable support to the army,  mopping up pockets of resistance. Göring was delighted with the performance.  Command and control problems were experienced, but owing to the flexibility and improvisation of both the army and Luftwaffe, these problems were solved. The Luftwaffe was to have in place a ground-to-air communication system, which played a vital role in the success of Fall Gelb. 
In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe assisted the Kriegsmarine and Heer in the invasion of Norway. Flying in reinforcements and winning air superiority, the Luftwaffe contributed decisively to the German conquest. 
In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe contributed to the unexpected success in the Battle of France. It destroyed three Allied Air Forces and helped secure the defeat of France in just over six weeks.  However, it could not destroy the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk despite intense bombing. The BEF escaped to continue the war. 
During the Battle of Britain in summer 1940, the Luftwaffe inflicted severe damage to the Royal Air Force, but did not achieve the air superiority that Hitler demanded for the proposed invasion of Britain, which was postponed and then cancelled in December 1940.  The Luftwaffe ravaged British cities during The Blitz, but failed to break British morale. Hitler had already ordered preparations to be made for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.
In spring 1941, the Luftwaffe helped its Axis partner, Italy, secure victory in the Balkans Campaign and continued to support Italy in the Mediterranean, Middle East and African theatres until May 1945.
In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe destroyed thousands of Soviet aircraft, yet it failed to destroy the Red Air Force altogether. Lacking strategic bombers (the very "Ural bombers" that General Wever had asked for six years before) the Luftwaffe could not strike at Soviet production centers regularly or with the needed force.  The Axis and Soviet air operations during Operation Barbarossa consumed vast numbers of men and planes. As the war dragged on, the Luftwaffe was eroded in strength. The defeats at the Battle of Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk ensured the gradual decline of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.
British historian Frederick Taylor asserts that "all sides bombed each other's cities during the war. Half a million Soviet citizens, for example, died from German bombing during the invasion and occupation of Russia. That's roughly equivalent to the number of German citizens who died from Allied raids." 
Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe continued to defend German-occupied Europe against the growing offensive power of RAF Bomber Command and, starting in the summer of 1942, the steadily building strength of the United States Army Air Forces. The mounting demands of the Defence of the Reich campaign gradually destroyed the Luftwaffe ' s fighter arm. Despite its belated use of advanced turbojet and rocket-propelled aircraft for bomber destroyer duties, it was overwhelmed by Allied numbers and a lack of trained pilots and fuel. A last-ditch attempt, known as Operation Bodenplatte, to win air superiority on 1 January 1945 failed. After the Bodenplatte effort, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force.
German day and night fighter pilots claimed more than 70,000 aerial victories during World War II.  Of these, about 745 victories are estimated to be achieved by jet fighters.  Flak shot down 25,000–30,000 Allied planes. Broken down on the different Allies, about 25,000 were American planes,  about 20,000 British, 46,100 Soviet,  1,274 French,  375 Polish,  and 81 Dutch as well as aircraft from other Allied nationalities.
The highest-scoring day fighter pilot was Erich Hartmann with 352 confirmed kills, all of them at the Eastern front against the Soviets. The leading aces in the west were Hans-Joachim Marseille with 158 kills against planes from the British Empire (RAF, RAAF, and SAAF) and Georg-Peter Eder with 56 kills of aircraft from the USAAF (of a total of 78). The most successful night fighter pilot was Heinz-Wolfgang Schnaufer, who is credited with 121 kills. 103 German fighter pilots shot down more than 100 enemy aircraft for a total of roughly 15,400 aerial victories. Roughly a further 360 pilots claimed between 40 and 100 aerial victories for round about 21,000 victories. Another 500 fighter pilots claimed between 20 and 40 victories for a total of 15,000 victories. Part of the reason German pilots scored such high victory totals was that they were in combat for the duration of the war-unlike the Allies, who rotated their flyers out of combat after a certain amount of time, German pilots flew until they were killed, captured or too badly wounded to keep flying. It is relatively certain that 2,500 German fighter pilots attained ace status, having achieved at least five aerial victories.   These achievements were honored with 453 German single and twin-engine (Messerschmitt Bf 110) day fighter pilots having received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. 85 night fighter pilots, including 14 crew members, were awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.  Some Bomber pilots were also highly successful. The Stuka and Schlachtflieger pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel flew 2,530 ground-attack missions and claimed the destruction of more than 519 tanks and a battleship, among others. He was the most highly decorated German serviceman of the Second World War. The Bomber pilot Hansgeorg Bätcher flew more than 658 combat missions destroying numerous ships and other targets.
Losses, on the other hand, were high as well. The estimated total number of destroyed and damaged for the war totaled 76,875 aircraft. Of these, about 43,000 were lost in combat, the rest in operational accidents and during training.  By type, losses totaled 21,452 fighters, 12,037 bombers, 15,428 trainers, 10,221 twin-engine fighters, 5,548 ground attack, 6,733 reconnaissance, and 6,141 transports. 
According to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht the losses of the flight personnel until February 1945 amounted to: 
- KIA: 6,527 officers and 43,517 enlisted men
- WIA: 4,194 officers and 27,811 enlisted men
- MIA: 4,361 officers and 27,240 enlisted men
total: 15,082 officers and 98,568 enlisted men
According to official statistics, total Luftwaffe casualties, including ground personnel, amounted to 138,596 killed and 156,132 missing through 31 January 1945. 
Lack of aerial defence Edit
The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Defence of the Reich campaign was a result of a number of factors. The Luftwaffe lacked an effective air defence system early in the war. Adolf Hitler's foreign policy had pushed Germany into war before these defences could be fully developed. The Luftwaffe was forced to improvise and construct its defences during the war.
The daylight actions over German-controlled territory were sparse in 1939–1940. The responsibility of the defence of German air space fell to the Luftgaukommandos (air district commands). The defence systems relied mostly on the "flak" arm. The defences were not coordinated and communication was poor. This lack of understanding between the flak and flying branches of the defence would plague the Luftwaffe throughout the war.  Hitler, in particular, wanted the defence to rest on anti-aircraft artillery as it gave the civilian population a "psychological crutch" no matter how ineffective the weapons. 
Most of the battles fought by the Luftwaffe on the Western Front were against the RAF's "Circus" raids and the occasional daylight raid into German air space. This was a fortunate position since the Luftwaffe ' s strategy of focusing its striking power on one front started to unravel with the failure of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The "peripheral" strategy of the Luftwaffe between 1939 and 1940 had been to deploy its fighter defences at the edges of Axis occupied territory, with little protecting the inner depths.  Moreover, the front line units in the West were complaining about the poor numbers and performance of aircraft. Units complained of lack of Zerstörer aircraft with all-weather capabilities and the "lack of climbing power of the Bf 109".  The Luftwaffe ' s technical edge was slipping as the only formidable new aircraft in the German arsenal was the Focke-Wulf Fw 190. Generalfeldmarschall Erhard Milch was to assist Ernst Udet with aircraft production increases and the introduction of more modern types of fighter aircraft. However, they explained at a meeting of the Reich Industrial Council on 18 September 1941 that the new next-generation aircraft had failed to materialize, and production of obsolete types had to continue to meet the growing need for replacements. 
The buildup of the Jagdwaffe ("Fighter Force") was too rapid and its quality suffered. It was not put under a unified command until 1943, which also affected the performance of the nine Jagdgeschwader fighter wings in existence in 1939. No further units were formed until 1942, and the years of 1940–1941 were wasted. OKL failed to construct a strategy instead, its command style was reactionary, and its measures not as effective without thorough planning. This was particularly apparent with the Sturmböck squadrons, formed to replace the increasingly ineffective twin-engined Zerstörer heavy fighter wings as the primary defense against USAAF daylight raids. The Sturmböcke flew Fw 190A fighters armed with heavy 20 mm and 30 mm cannon to destroy heavy bombers, but this increased the weight and affected the performance of the Fw 190 at a time when the aircraft were meeting large numbers of equal if not superior Allied types. 
Daytime aerial defense against the USAAF's strongly defended heavy bomber forces, particularly the Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force, had its successes through the calendar year of 1943. But at the start of 1944, Eighth AF commander Jimmy Doolittle made a major change in offensive fighter tactics, which defeated the Luftwaffe ' s day fighter force from that time onwards. Steadily increasing numbers of the superlative North American P-51 Mustang single-engine fighter, leading the USAAF's bombers into German airspace defeated first the Bf 110 Zerstörer wings, then the Fw 190A Sturmböcke.
Development and equipment Edit
In terms of technological development, the failure to develop a long-range bomber and capable long-range fighters during this period left the Luftwaffe unable to conduct a meaningful strategic bombing campaign throughout the war.  However, Germany at that time suffered from limitations in raw materials such as oil and aluminium, which meant that there were insufficient resources for much beyond a tactical air force: given these circumstances, the Luftwaffe ' s reliance on tactical mid-range, twin-engined medium bombers and short-range dive-bombers was a pragmatic choice of strategy.   It might also be argued that the Luftwaffe ' s Kampfgeschwader medium and heavy bomber wings were perfectly capable of attacking strategic targets, but the lack of capable long-range escort fighters left the bombers unable to carry out their missions effectively against determined and well-organised fighter opposition. 
The greatest failure for the Kampfgeschwader, however, was being saddled with an aircraft intended as a capable four-engined heavy bomber: the perpetually troubled Heinkel He 177, whose engines were prone to catch fire in flight. Of the three parallel proposals from the Heinkel engineering departments for a four-engined version of the A-series He 177 by February 1943, one of these being the Heinkel firm's Amerikabomber candidate, only one, the He 177B, emerged in the concluding months of 1943. Only three airworthy prototypes of the B-series He 177 design were produced by early 1944, some three years after the first prototype flights of the Avro Lancaster, the most successful RAF heavy bomber.
Another failure of procurement and equipment was the lack of a dedicated naval air arm. General Felmy had already expressed a desire to build a naval air arm to support Kriegsmarine operations in the Atlantic and British waters. Britain was dependent on food and raw materials from its Empire and North America. Felmy pressed this case firmly throughout 1938 and 1939, and, on 31 October 1939, Großadmiral Erich Raeder sent a strongly worded letter to Göring in support of such proposals. The early-war twin-engined Heinkel He 115 floatplane and Dornier Do 18 flying boat were too slow and short-ranged. The then-contemporary Blohm & Voss BV 138 Seedrache (seadragon) trimotor flying boat became the Luftwaffe ' s primary seaborne maritime patrol platform, with nearly 300 examples built its trio of Junkers Jumo 205 diesel engines gave it a 4,300 km (2,670 mi) maximum range. Another Blohm und Voss design of 1940, the enormous, 46-meter wingspan six-engined Blohm und Voss BV 222 Wiking maritime patrol flying boat, would see it capable of a 6,800 km (4,200-mile) range at maximum endurance when using higher-output versions of the same Jumo 205 powerplants as used by the BV 138, in later years. The Dornier Do 217 would have been ideal as a land-based choice but suffered production problems. Raeder also complained about the poor standard of aerial torpedoes, although their design was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht combined military's naval arm (the Kriegsmarine), even considering production of the Japanese Type 91 torpedo used at Pearl Harbor as the Lufttorpedo LT 850 by August 1942. (See both:Yanagi missions and Heinkel He 111 torpedo bomber operations)  
Without specialised naval or land-based, purpose-designed maritime patrol aircraft, the Luftwaffe was forced to improvise. The Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor airliner's airframe – engineered for civilian airliner use – lacked the structural strength for combat maneuvering at lower altitudes, making it unsuitable for use as a bomber in maritime patrol duties. The Condor lacked speed, armour and bomb load capacity. Sometimes the fuselage literally "broke its back" or a wing panel dropped loose from the wing root after a hard landing. Nevertheless, this civilian transport was adapted for the long-range reconnaissance and anti-shipping roles and, between August 1940 and February 1941, Fw 200s sank 85 vessels for a claimed total of 363,000 Grt. Had the Luftwaffe focused on naval aviation – particularly maritime patrol aircraft with long range, like the aforementioned diesel-powered multi-engine Blohm & Voss flying boats – Germany might well have been in a position to win the Battle of the Atlantic. However, Raeder and the Kriegsmarine failed to press for naval air power until the war began, mitigating the Luftwaffe ' s responsibility. In addition, Göring regarded any other branch of the German military developing its own aviation as an encroachment on his authority and continually frustrated the Navy's attempts to build its own airpower. 
The absence of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe, following General Wever's accidental death in the early summer of 1936 and the end of the Ural bomber program he fostered before the invasion of Poland, would not be addressed again until the authorization of the "Bomber B" design competition in July 1939, which sought to replace the medium bomber force with which the Luftwaffe was to begin the war, and the partly achieved Schnellbomber high-speed medium bomber concept with more advanced, twin-engined high-speed bomber aircraft fitted with pairs of relatively "high-power" engines of 1,500 kW (2,000 hp) output levels and upwards each as a follow-on to the earlier Schnellbomber project, that would also be able to function as shorter-range heavy bombers.
The spring 1942 Amerikabomber program also sought to produce useful strategic bomber designs for the Luftwaffe, with their prime design priority being an advanced trans-oceanic range capability as the main aim of the project to directly attack the United States from Europe or the Azores. Inevitably, both the Bomber B and Amerikabomber programs were victims of the continued emphasis of the Wehrmacht combined military's insistence for its Luftwaffe air arm to support the Heer as its primary mission, and the damage to the German aviation industry from Allied bomber attacks.
Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues Edit
The RLM's apparent lack of a dedicated "technical-tactical" department, that would have directly been in contact with combat pilots to assess their needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice, had never been seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the planning of the original German air arm.  The RLM did have its own Technisches Amt (T-Amt) department to handle aviation technology issues, but this was tasked with handling all aviation technology issues in the Third Reich, both military and civilian in nature, and also not known to have ever had any clear and actively administrative and consultative links with the front-line forces established for such purposes. On the front-line combat side of the issue, and for direct contact with the German aviation firms making the Luftwaffe ' s warplanes, the Luftwaffe did have its own reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or Erprobungstellen located at three coastal sites – Peenemünde-West (also incorporating a separate facility in nearby Karlshagen), Tarnewitz and Travemünde – and the central inland site of Rechlin, itself first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire, with the four-facility system commanded later in World War II by Oberst (Colonel) Edgar Petersen. However, due to lack of co-ordination between the RLM and OKL, all fighter and bomber development was oriented toward short-range aircraft, as they could be produced in greater numbers, rather than quality long-range aircraft, something that put the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage as early as the Battle of Britain.  The "ramp-up" to production levels required to fulfill the Luftwaffe ' s front-line needs was also slow, not reaching maximum output until 1944.  Production of fighters was not given priority until 1944 Adolf Galland commented that this should have occurred at least a year earlier.  Galland also pointed to the mistakes and challenges made in the development of the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet – which included the protracted development time required for its Junkers Jumo 004 jet engines to achieve reliability. German combat aircraft types that were first designed and flown in the mid-1930s had become obsolete, yet were kept in production, in particular the Ju 87 Stuka, and the Bf 109, because there were no well-developed replacement designs. 
Production failures Edit
The failure of German production was evident from the start of the Battle of Britain. By the end of 1940, the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses and needed to regroup. Deliveries of new aircraft were insufficient to meet the drain on resources the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, was failing to expand its pilot and aircraft numbers.  This was partly owing to production planning failures before the war and the demands of the army. Nevertheless, the German aircraft industry was being outproduced in 1940. In terms of fighter aircraft production, the British exceeded their production plans by 43%, while the Germans remained 40% "behind" target by summer 1940. In fact, German production in fighters fell from 227 to 177 per month between July and September 1940.  One of the many reasons for the failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940 was that it did not have the operational and material means to destroy the British aircraft industry,  something that the much-anticipated Bomber B design competition was intended to address.
The so-called "Göring program", had largely been predicated on the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941. After the Wehrmacht's failure in front of Moscow, industrial priorities for a possibility in increasing aircraft production were largely abandoned in favor to support the army's increased attrition rates and heavy equipment losses.  Erhard Milch's reforms expanded production rates. In 1941 an average of 981 aircraft (including 311 fighters) were produced each month.  In 1942 this rose to 1,296 aircraft of which 434 were fighters.  Milch's planned production increases were initially opposed. But in June, he was granted materials for 900 fighters per month as the average output. By the Summer of 1942, Luftwaffe's operational fighter force had recovered from a low of 39% (44% for fighters and 31% for bombers) in Winter of 1941–1942, to 69% by late June (75% for fighters and 66% for bombers) in 1942. However, after increased commitments in the east, overall operational ready rates fluctuated between 59% and 65% for the remaining year.  Throughout 1942 the Luftwaffe was out produced in fighter aircraft by 250% and in twin-engine aircraft by 196%. 
The appointment of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments increased production of existing designs and the few new designs that had originated from earlier in the war. However, the intensification of Allied bombing caused the dispersion of production and prevented an efficient acceleration of expansion. German aviation production reached about 36,000 combat aircraft for 1944. However, by the time this was achieved the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel and trained pilots to make this achievement worthwhile. 
The failure to maximize production immediately after the failures in the Soviet Union and North Africa ensured the Luftwaffe ' s effective defeat in the period of September 1943 – February 1944. Despite the tactical victories won, they failed to achieve a decisive victory. By the time production reached acceptable levels, as so many other factors had for the Luftwaffe – and for the entire Wehrmacht's weapons and ordnance technology as a whole – late in the war, it was "too little, too late". 
Engine development Edit
By the late 1930s, airframe construction methods had progressed to the point where airframes could be built to any required size, founded on the all-metal airframe design technologies pioneered by Hugo Junkers in 1915 and constantly improved upon for over two decades to follow – especially in Germany with aircraft like the Dornier Do X flying boat and the Junkers G 38 airliner. However, powering such designs was a major challenge. Mid-1930s aero engines were limited to about 600 hp and the first 1000 hp engines were just entering the prototype stage – for the then-new Third Reich's Luftwaffe air arm, this meant liquid-cooled inverted V12 designs like the Daimler-Benz DB 601. [ citation needed ]
The United States had already gotten its start towards this goal by 1937 with two large displacement, twin-row 18-cylinder air-cooled radial engine designs of at least 46 litres (2,800 in 3 ) displacement each: the Pratt & Whitney Double Wasp and the Wright Duplex-Cyclone. 
Nazi Germany's initial need for substantially more powerful aviation engines originated with the private venture Heinkel He 119 high-speed reconnaissance design, and the ostensibly twin-"engined" Messerschmitt Me 261 for maritime reconnaissance duties – to power each of these designs, Daimler-Benz literally "doubled-up" their new, fuel-injected DB 601 engines. This "doubling-up" involved placing two DB 601s side by side on either side of a common vertical-plane space frame with their crankcases' outer sides each having a mount similar to what would be used in a single-engine installation, creating a "mirror-image" centrifugal supercharger for the starboard-side component DB 601, inclining the top ends of their crankcases inwards by roughly 30º to mate with the space-frame central mount, and placing a common propeller gear reduction housing across the front ends of the two engines. Such a twin-crankcase "power system" aviation engine crafted from a pair of DB 601s resulted in the 2,700 PS (1,986 kW) maximum output DB 606 "coupled" engine design for these two aircraft in February 1937, but with each of the DB 606 "coupled" engines weighing in at around 1.5 tonnes apiece. 
The early development of the DB 606 "coupled" engines, was paralleled during the late 1930s with Daimler-Benz's simultaneous development of a 1,500 kW class engine design using a single crankcase. The result was the twenty-four cylinder Daimler-Benz DB 604 X-configuration engine, with four banks of six cylinders each. Possessing essentially the same displacement of 46.5 litres (2830 in 3 ) as the initial version of the liquid-cooled Junkers Jumo 222 multibank engine, itself a "converse" choice in configuration to the DB 604 in possessing six banks of four inline cylinders apiece instead coincidentally, both the original Jumo 222 design and the DB 604 each weighed about a third less (at some 1,080 kg/2,379 lb of dry weight) than the DB 606, but the DB 604's protracted development was diverting valuable German aviation powerplant research resources, and with more development of the "twinned-DB 605" based DB 610 coupled engine (itself initiated in June 1940 with a top output level of 2950 PS (2,909 hp),  and brought together in the same way – with the same all-up weight of 1.5 tonnes – as the DB 606 had been) giving improved results at the time, the Reich Air Ministry stopped all work on the DB 604 in September 1942.  Such "coupled powerplants" were the exclusive choice of power for the Heinkel He 177A Greif heavy bomber, mistasked from its beginnings in being intended to do moderate-angle "dive bombing" for a 30-meter wingspan class, heavy bomber design – the twin nacelles for a pair of DB 606s or 610s did reduce drag for such a combat "requirement", but the poor design of the He 177A's engine accommodations for these twin-crankcase "power systems" caused repeated outbreaks of engine fires, causing the "dive bombing" requirement for the He 177A to be cancelled by mid-September 1942. 
BMW worked on what was essentially an enlarged version of its highly successful BMW 801 design from the Focke-Wulf Fw 190A. This led to the 53.7-litre displacement BMW 802 in 1943, an eighteen-cylinder air-cooled radial, which nearly matched the American Duplex-Cyclone's 54.9-litre figure, but with a weight of some 1,530 kg (3,370 lb) matching that of the 24-cylinder liquid-cooled inline DB 606 and the even larger, 83.5-litre displacement BMW 803 28-cylinder liquid-cooled radial, which from post-war statements from BMW development personnel were each considered to be "secondary priority" development programs at best. This situation with the 802 and 803 designs led to the company's engineering personnel being redirected to place all efforts on improving the 801 to develop it to its full potential.  The BMW 801F radial development, through its use of features coming from the 801E subtype, was able to substantially exceed the over-1,500 kW output level.  The two closest Allied equivalents to the 801 in configuration and displacement – the American Wright Twin Cyclone, and the Soviet Shvetsov ASh-82 radials – never had any need to be developed beyond a 1,500 kW output level, as larger-displacement, 18-cylinder radial aviation engines in both nations (the aforementioned American Double Wasp and Duplex-Cyclone) and the eventual 1945 premiere of the Soviet Shvetsov ASh-73 design, all three of which started their development before 1940, handled needs for even greater power from large radial aviation engines. [ citation needed ]
The twinned-up Daimler-Benz DB 601-based, 1,750 kW output DB 606, and its more powerful descendant, the 2,130 kW output DB 605-based DB 610, weighing some 1.5 tonnes apiece, were the only 1,500 kW-plus output level aircraft powerplants to ever be produced by Germany for Luftwaffe combat aircraft, mostly for the aforementioned Heinkel He 177A heavy bomber. Even the largest-displacement inverted V12 aircraft powerplant built in Germany, the 44.52-litre (2,717 cu. in.) Daimler-Benz DB 603, which saw widespread use in twin-engined designs, could not exceed the 1,500 kW output level without more development. By March 1940, even the DB 603 was being "twinned-up"  as the 601/606 and 605/610 had been, to become their replacement "power system": this was the strictly experimental, approximately 1.8-tonne weight apiece, twin-crankcase DB 613 capable of over 2,570 kW (3,495 PS) output, but which never left its test phase. [ citation needed ]
The proposed over-1,500 kW output subtypes of German aviation industry's existing piston aviation engine designs—which adhered to using just a single crankcase that were able to substantially exceed the aforementioned over-1,500 kW output level—were the DB 603 LM (1,800 kW at take-off, in production), the DB 603 N (2,205 kW at take-off, planned for 1946) and the BMW 801F (1,765 kW (2,400 PS) engines. The pioneering nature of jet engine technology in the 1940s resulted in numerous development problems for both of Germany's major jet engine designs to see mass production, the Jumo 004 and BMW 003 (both of pioneering axial flow design), with the more powerful Heinkel HeS 011 never leaving the test phase, as only 19 examples of the HeS 011 would ever be built for development.  Even with such dismal degrees of success for such advanced aviation powerplant designs, more and more design proposals for new German combat aircraft in the 1943–45 period centered either around the failed Jumo 222 or HeS 011 aviation powerplants for their propulsion. [ citation needed ]
Personnel and leadership Edit
The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, OKW argued, was still an offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until the second half of 1943.  During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates  as the need arose to replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant reduced training on operational types, formation flying, gunnery training, and combat training, and a total lack of instrument training. 
At the beginning of the war, commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a front-line post fully qualified. Training of formation leaders was not systematic until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of staff officers to set up new combat units with carefully selected and skilled combat personnel, and pass on experience. 
Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its ability to replace losses,  while also planning for "short sharp campaigns",  which did not pertain. Moreover, no plans were laid for night fighters.  In fact, when protests were raised, Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can start training!" 
The Luftwaffe was unusual among contemporary independent air forces in possessing an organic paratrooper force called Fallschirmjäger. Established in 1938, they were deployed in parachute operations in 1940 and 1941 and participated in the Battle of Fort Eben-Emael and the Battle for The Hague in May 1940, and during the Battle of Crete in May 1941. However, more than 4,000 Fallschirmjäger were killed during the Crete operation.  Afterwards, although continuing to be trained in parachute delivery, paratroopers were only used in a parachute role for smaller-scale operations, such as the rescue of Benito Mussolini in 1943. Fallschirmjäger formations were mainly used as light infantry in all theatres of the war. Their losses were 22,041 KIA, 57,594 WIA and 44,785 MIA (until February 1945). 
During 1942 surplus Luftwaffe personnel was used to form the Luftwaffe Field Divisions, standard infantry divisions that were used chiefly as rear echelon units to free up front line troops. From 1943, the Luftwaffe also had an armoured division called Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1 Hermann Göring, which was expanded to a Panzerkorps in 1944. [ citation needed ]
Ground support and combat units from the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) and the National Socialist Motor Corps (NSKK) were also put at the Luftwaffe ' s disposal during the war. In 1942 56 RAD companies served with the Luftwaffe in the West as airfield construction troops. In 1943 420 RAD companies were trained as anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and posted to existing Luftwaffe AAA battalions in the homeland. At the end of the war, these units were also fighting allied tanks. Beginning in 1939 with a transport regiment, the NSKK had in 1942 a complete division-sized transportation unit serving the Luftwaffe, the NSKK Transportgruppe Luftwaffe serving in France and at the Eastern front. The overwhelming number of its 12,000 members were Belgian, Dutch and French collaborators. 
Forced labor Edit
In 1943 and 1944, aircraft production was moved to concentration camps in order to alleviate labor shortages and to protect production from Allied air raids. The two largest aircraft factories in Germany were located at Mauthausen-Gusen and Mittelbau-Dora concentration camps.  Aircraft parts were also manufactured at Flossenbürg, Buchenwald, Dachau, Ravensbrück, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler, Herzogenbusch, and Neuengamme.   In 1944 and 1945, as many as 90,000 concentration prisoners worked in the aviation industry, and were about one tenth of the concentration camp population over the winter of 1944–45.  [N 3] Partly in response to the Luftwaffe ' s demand for more forced laborers to increase fighter production, the concentration camp more than doubled between mid-1943 (224,000) and mid-1944 (524,000).  Part of this increase was due to the deportation of the Hungarian Jews the Jägerstab program was used to justify the deportations to the Hungarian government. Of the 437,000 Hungarian Jews deported between May and July 1944, about 320,000 were gassed on arrival at Auschwitz and the remainder forced to work. Only 50,000 survived.  
Almost 1,000 fuselages of the jet fighter Messerschmitt Me 262 were produced at Gusen, a subcamp of Mauthausen and brutal Nazi labor camp,   where the average life expectancy was six months.  By 1944, one-third of production at the crucial Regensburg plant that produced the Bf 109, the backbone of the Luftwaffe fighter arm, originated in Gusen and Flossenbürg alone.  Synthetic oil was produced from shale oil deposits by prisoners of Mittlebau-Dora as part of Operation Desert directed by Edmund Geilenberg in order to make up for the decrease in oil production due to Allied bombing. For oil production, three subcamps were constructed and 15,000 prisoners forced to work in the plant. More than 3,500 people died.  Vaivara concentration camp in Estonia was also established for shale oil extraction  about 20,000 prisoners worked there and more than 1,500 died at Vaivara. 
Luftwaffe airfields were frequently maintained using forced labor. Thousands of inmates from five subcamps of Stutthof worked on the airfields.  Airfields and bases near several other concentration camps [N 4] and ghettos [N 5] were constructed or maintained by prisoners. On the orders of the Luftwaffe, prisoners from Buchenwald and Herzogenbusch were forced to defuse bombs that had fallen around Düsseldorf  and Leeuwarden respectively. 
Thousands of Luftwaffe personnel worked as concentration camp guards. Auschwitz included a munitions factory guarded by Luftwaffe soldiers  2,700 Luftwaffe personnel worked as guards at Buchenwald.  Dozens of camps and subcamps were staffed primarily by Luftwaffe soldiers. [N 6] According to the Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, it was typical for camps devoted to armaments production to be run by the branch of the Wehrmacht that used the products.  In 1944, many Luftwaffe soldiers were transferred to concentration camps to alleviate personnel shortages. 
Luftwaffe troops participated in the murder of Jews imprisoned in ghettos in Eastern Europe. For example, they assisted in the murder of 2,680 Jews at the Nemirov ghetto,  participated in a series of massacres at the Opoczno ghetto,  and helped to liquidate the Dęblin–Irena Ghetto by deporting thousands of Jews to the Treblinka extermination camp.  Between 1942 and 1944, two Luftwaffe security battalions were stationed in the Białowieża Forest for Bandenbekämpfung [N 7] operations.  Encouraged by Göring, they murdered thousands of Jews and other civilians.  Luftwaffe soldiers frequently executed Polish civilians at random with baseless accuastions of being "Bolshevik agents", in order to keep the population in line,  or as reprisal for partisan activities.  The performance of the troops was measured by the body count of people murdered.  Ten thousand Luftwaffe troops were stationed on the Eastern Front for such "anti-partisan" operations. 
Human experimentation Edit
Throughout the war, concentration camp prisoners were forced to serve as human guinea pigs in testing Luftwaffe equipment. Some of these experiments were carried out by Luftwaffe personnel and others were performed by the SS on the orders of the OKL.
In 1941, experiments with the intent of discovering how to prevent and treat hypothermia were carried out for the Luftwaffe, which had lost aircrew to immersion hypothermia after ditchings.  The experiments were conducted at Dachau and Auschwitz. Sigmund Rascher, a Luftwaffe  doctor based at Dachau, published the results at the 1942 medical conference entitled "Medical Problems Arising from Sea and Winter".  Of about 400 prisoners forced to participate in cold-water experiments, 80 to 90 were killed. 
In early 1942, prisoners at Dachau were used by Rascher in experiments to perfect ejection seats at high altitudes. A low-pressure chamber containing these prisoners was used to simulate conditions at altitudes of up to 20,000 metres (66,000 ft). It was rumoured that Rascher performed vivisections on the brains of victims who survived the initial experiment.  Of the 200 subjects, 80 died from the experimentation,  and the others were executed.  Eugen Hagen, head doctor of the Luftwaffe, infected inmates of Natzweiler concentration camp with typhus in order to test the efficacy of proposed vaccines. 
Aerial bombing of non-military targets Edit
No positive or specific customary international humanitarian law with respect to aerial warfare existed prior to or during World War II.  This is also why no Luftwaffe officers were prosecuted at the post-World War II Allied war crime trials for the aerial raids. 
The bombing of Wieluń was an air raid on the Polish town of Wieluń by the Luftwaffe on 1 September 1939. The Luftwaffe started bombing Wieluń at 04:40, five minutes before the shelling of Westerplatte, which has traditionally been considered the beginning of World War II in Europe. The air raid on the town was one of the first aerial bombings of the war.  About 1,300 civilians were killed, hundreds were injured, and 90 percent of the town centre was destroyed. The casualty rate was more than twice as high as Guernica.  A 1989 Sender Freies Berlin documentary stated that there were no military or industrial targets in the area,   except for a small sugar factory in the outskirts of the town. Furthermore, Trenkner stated that German bombers first destroyed the town's hospital.  Two attempts, in 1978 and 1983, to prosecute individuals for the bombing of the Wieluń hospital were dismissed by West German judges when prosecutors stated that the pilots had been unable to make out the nature of the structure due to fog.  
Operation Retribution was the April 1941 German bombing of Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The bombing deliberately targeted the killing of civilians as punishment and resulted in 17,000 civilian deaths.  It occurred in the first days of the World War II German-led Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. The operation commenced on 6 April and concluded on 7 or 8 April, resulting in the paralysis of Yugoslav civilian and military command and control, widespread destruction in the centre of the city and many civilian casualties. Following the Yugoslav capitulation, Luftwaffe engineers conducted a bomb damage assessment in Belgrade. The report stated that 218.5 metric tons (215.0 long tons 240.9 short tons) of bombs were dropped, with 10 to 14 percent being incendiaries. It listed all the targets of the bombing, which included: the royal palace, the war ministry, military headquarters, the central post office, the telegraph office, passenger and goods railway stations, power stations and barracks. It also mentioned that seven aerial mines were dropped and that areas in the centre and northwest of the city had been destroyed, comprising 20 to 25 percent of its total area. Some aspects of the bombing remain unexplained, particularly the use of the aerial mines.  In contrast, Pavlowitch states that almost 50 percent of housing in Belgrade was destroyed.  After the invasion, the Germans forced between 3,500 and 4,000 Jews to collect rubble that was caused by the bombing. 
Several prominent Luftwaffe commanders were convicted of war crimes, including General Alexander Löhr  and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring. 
History HL - Spanish Civil War
* To maintain power of the monarchy at all costs and to ensure his position in the monarchy.
* The restoration of Christian worship throughout the country
*To unify Spain under one monarchy
* Priests were no longer paid by the state, but they were guaranteed a spot in education and economy. → used its wealth to gain power and social influence.
* They were opposed to modernising and liberal forces the aristocracy was closely tied to the church.
* They had their own languages and cultures → wanted it taught in schools
* Had their own industrialised economies and churches
* Doesn't support nationalism
* Thought that people should be trusted to rule themselves
* Wanted complete freedom and reforms, more power to working class
* Gave a speech including thirteen points to influence the Western democracies and the soldiers of General Franco/Spanish Nationalists
* Wanted a negotiated peace
Results: the relationship between Italy and Germany was cemented in Spain, Victory in favour of the Nationalists
Benefits: - increased Mussolini's popularity
Italian military help to Nationalists against anti-Catholic atrocities helped Italian propaganda targeting Catholics
* France was worried that the civil war would spread to France
* The USA did it because they were influenced by the powerful Catholic lobby there
* This prevented the Republic from purchasing arms openly hampered its ability to resist the Nationalist threat
Thought republicans were communists
* The civilians in each country did not want to be part of the war
* A large number of the mostly young recruits were Communists before they became involved in the conflict more joined the party during the course of the war
* Thought Fascism was the future
* Wanted to be seen as fighting communism
* They knew a WWII was going to happen so wanted to squash fascism quickly
* Foreign aid: Mussolini and Hitler
* Britain and France had an isolationist policy, appeasement to Hitler, don't wanna be seen as helping communists
United leadership under General Franco
* Republicans had factions and disagreements
Factions started fighting each other
* Lack of equipment for Republican Government, only Soviet Union and Mexico sent equipment (but they were far so not very effective)
* Lack of equipment meant the Republican Army fought well on defence but never had the strength to launch a successful offensive
* Objectives of Republicans was more hazy
* Homefront was totally involved
* Propaganda was used to dehumanize the enemy
Civilians were victims of bombing raids
* Multiple forces involved
Countries involved: Spain, Italy, Germany, Portugal, the Vatican, USSR, Mexico -->
Volunteers from the International Brigade
* Duration of the war was long → 3 years
* More efficient technology and military tactics
* Cavalry charges were effective
* New technology → dominance of air power
Control of the sea → Italian maintained supply routes for the Nationalists
* Nature of land warfare changed → used tanks, artillery and air bombardment to prepare for an advance
Aerial Warfare and the Spanish Civil War
During the Spanish Civil War there was no greater provider of assistance to the nationalist cause than the Kingdom of Italy and a key component of the military forces sent to aid the Spanish anti-communists was the Aviazione Legonaria.
Air Combat over Jarama, Spain.
In the years between the world wars, governments and military leaders theorized about the future of aerial warfare. But during this almost two-decade period, there was only one major military conflict–the Spanish Civil War. Although only a few countries officially participated, they found it invaluable preparation for World War II.
The Spanish Civil War had its beginnings in Spain’s elections of February 1936. The Republicans, consisting of the Communists, Socialists, and Basque and Catalonian separatists, won by a narrow margin. Under the leadership of Jose Calvo Sotelo, the right wing (monarchists, the military, and the Fascist Party) continued to oppose the elected government. In July, the Republicans arrested, then assassinated Sotelo, ostensibly in retaliation for the killing of a policeman by the Fascists. The right wing, now united as Nationalists, used this as their justification for launching a revolution. On July 17, 1936, General Francisco Franco and soldiers loyal to him seized a Spanish Army outpost in Morocco. In Spain, other Nationalist troops quickly seized other garrisons. A junta of generals, led by Franco, declared themselves the legal government, and the war officially began.
The world was forced to take sides. Many countries, including the United States and Great Britain, chose to stay neutral, believing that involvement would lead to war. However, individuals from neutral countries did volunteer with the Republican’s International Brigade, feeling the cause was worth fighting for. A group of three Americans pilots formed the Patrolla Americana, which eventually grew into a unit of 20 pilots. The Soviet Union, recognizing a potential Communist nation threatened by fascism, was quick to offer aid, including equipment, soldiers, and senior advisors. Many of their planes, including the Polikarpov I-15 and I-16, formed the backbone of the Republican Air Force. And as a gesture to protect itself from being surrounded on three sides by Fascist nations, France provided some aircraft and artillery.
Because a non-intervention agreement in 1936 forbade sympathetic nations to provide airplanes to the competing sides, it was difficult for the Republican government to develop a solid aviation program. It bought small amounts of aircraft where it could, which meant that its air force was composed of small numbers of a lot of different airplanes, from different companies and countries. The Republican government also accepted civilian aircraft, such as the Lockheed Orion, which it could then adapt to military use. There was also a Boeing P-26 that had been brought over as a demonstration model for the Spanish Air Force before the war and was “inherited” by the Republicans.
The Fascist nations found ways to avoid the rules of the non-intervention agreement. Benito Mussolini in Italy was quick to support Franco and sent Spain more than 700 airplanes and troops during the conflict. But it was Germany that was most instrumental in the war. Only days after the war erupted, Franco had sent a request for help to Adolph Hitler.
For Germany, the Spanish Civil War came at an opportune time. The nation was initiating a rearmament program, in violation of the World War I peace treaty. A war in Spain would distract the world’s governments from this transgression. Plus, Spain had raw materials that Germany could use. Hitler also liked the idea of threatening France with a Fascist government to its south. But most importantly, Spain would provide an opportunity to test equipment and train troops. Although Hitler was careful not to send enough troops to make the world perceive them as a combatant nation, 19,000 German “volunteers” gained valuable combat experience in Spain. Because the Nationalists already had strong army support, Germany sent over mostly aviators from the Luftwaffe.
The Germans were organized into the Condor Legion that was equipped with the most modern airplanes and a specially trained staff. Many of the newest airplanes were tested in real combat situations, among them the Heinkel He.111, and the Messerschmitt Bf.109. The Legion was divided into bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, seaplane, communication, medical, and anti-aircraft battalions, and also included an experimental flight group. The chief of staff was Colonel Wolfram von Richthofen, a cousin of “The Red Baron.”
The first challenge the German Condor Legion faced was the 20,000 Nationalist troops stranded at the outpost in Morocco, prevented by a Spanish Navy blockade that was loyal to the Republicans from joining the remainder of the Nationalist Army in Seville. The Condor Legion succeeded in evacuating the troops by air—something that had never been done before. On August 6, twenty Junkers Ju-52 transports arrived in Morocco. Over the next two months, the Condor Legion transported all the Nationalist troops to Seville, with the loss of only one airplane. U.S. General Hap Arnold later described the airlift as the most important air power development of the interwar period.
After the evacuation, the Condor Legion settled into other jobs. It flew harassment raids against Republican forces and supported ground forces. And it initiated both strategic and tactical bombings. While military thinkers of the time were debating the validity of aerial bombing, the German troops in Spain were obtaining practical experience.
The Condor Legion used tactical bombing after Soviet airplanes began arriving in October 1936 to strengthen the Republican side. Bombings would weaken the troops for the ground attack. In Bilbao, in the north of Spain, saturation bombing was used to shatter the Republican “Iron Belt”—a 35-kilometer (22-mile)-long line, leaving holes open for advancements it also prevented Republican reinforcements from reaching the gaps.
But it was the strategic bombing attacks that attracted the most attention. In the beginning, methods were crude Republican bombers were given tourist maps to help find their targets. But soon, the attacks became routine. Yet there were no riots or uprisings as theorists had anticipated. Instead, civilian resistance and resolve on both sides were strengthened. One British observer noted that the Spanish would “blacken every balcony so as to get a good view of bursting shrapnel.”
Of all the bombing raids, it was the attack on Guernica, a city in the north of Spain, which came to symbolize the horrors of aerial bombing. Guernica was the center of Basque identity and culture, boasting the parliament building and an oak tree under which Basque leaders annually swore to uphold the liberties of the people. For three hours on the afternoon of April 26, 1937, planes from the Condor Legion dropped 100,000 pounds (almost 91 million kilograms) of bombs on the city and strafed citizens in the street by machine guns. Republican sources reported 1,500 dead. The only military target in town, a bridge, remained untouched. Instead, it appeared to many, including a London Times correspondent, that “the object of the bombardment was seemingly the demoralization of the civilian population and the destruction of the cradle of the Basque race.”
Everyone was shocked by the attack, which raised ethical questions all over the world. For many years, the Nationalists denied involvement and claimed that the Basques had bombed themselves for propaganda. They did not admit their involvement until they released reports in the 1970s, after Franco’s death. The Republicans used the tragedy to gain support, displaying Pablo Picasso’s painting Guernicain the Spanish Pavilion at the 1938 Paris World’s Fair. But in the end, the greatest effect of the bombing was to make some European nations fear they might be the next Guernica and thus, they capitulated to Hitler’s demands at Munich in September 1938.
At the Nuremberg trials following World War II, Luftwaffe commandant Hermann Goering said, “Spain gave me an opportunity to try out my young air force.” The experience gained in Spain helped Germany in the early months of the war far more than the desktop theories and controlled tests of other nations. Having noted poor results from strategic bombing, Germany focused its funds elsewhere. Many planes were tested in real combat situations. And Germany also learned that even with air superiority, a bomber force still required a fighter escort.
But most instrumental were the 19,000 Luftwaffe personnel who rotated through the Condor Legion until the Republicans surrendered in January 1939, leaving the Fascists and Franco in power. Several months later, these veterans of the Spanish Civil War would be flying over Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, and the rest of Europe–an experienced, well-trained air force fighting for Hitler.
Sources and additional reading:
Boyne, Walter. The Smithsonian Book of Flight. New York: Wing Books, 1987.
Buckley, John. Air Power in the Age of Total War. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999.
Corum, James S. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1941. Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1999.
Howson, Gerald. Aircraft of the Spanish Civil War. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1990.
Kennett, Lee. A History of Strategic Bombing. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1982.
Pape, Robert A. Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Ries, Karl and Ring, H. The Legion Condor: A History of the Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939. West Chester, Pa.: Schiffer Military History, 1992.
Robb, Theodore K. “Artists at War: Picasso’s Guernica.” MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Air Power Issue, 1996.
Outcome [ edit | edit source ]
Early intervention helped to ensure that the Nationalist faction survived the initial stages of the war German involvement then steadily expanded. The training they provided to Nationalist force proved as valuable, if not more so, than direct actions. ] Approximately 56,000 Nationalist soldiers were trained by various German detachments in Spain, who were technically proficient these covered infantry, tanks and anti-tank units, air and anti-aircraft forces, and those trained in naval warfare. ]
The Condor Legion spearheaded many Nationalist victories, particularly providing air dominance from 1937 onwards 300 air-to-air victories were claimed, although this was dwarfed by some 900 claimed by Italian forces. ] Spain provided a proving ground for German tank tactics, as well as aircraft tactics, the latter being only moderately successful. Ultimately, the air superiority which allowed certain parts of the Legion to excel would not be replicated in World War II because of the unsuccessful Battle of Britain. ]
A total of approximately 16,000 German citizens fought in the Civil War, mostly as pilots, ground crew, artillery men, tank crew, and as military advisers and instructors. About 10,000 Germans was the maximum strength at any one time. Approximately 300 Germans were killed. ] During the course of the war, Germany sent 732 combat aircraft and 110 trainer aircraft to Spain. ] German aid to the Nationalists amounted to approximately £43,000,000 ($215,000,000) in 1939 prices. ] [nb 4] This was broken down in expenditure to: 15.5% used for salaries and expenses, 21.9% used for direct delivery of supplies to Spain, and 62.6% expended on the Condor Legion. No detailed list of German supplies furnished to Spain has been found. ] Franco had also agreed to sign over the output of six mines to help pay for German aid. ] ] [nb 5]